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Key Bridge Project Federal Issues: October 2026 Update |
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has only validated and obligated $73 million so far, and that amount can
fund almost nothing permanent. Until FHWA determines the eligible replacement
cost and issues a construction NTP, no major federal money exists for permanent
foundation work.
Even if a few dozen production piles are being driven under early‑work packages
(and I frankly do not trust this agency's reports), it’s still optics — the
federally funded rebuild has not begun.
Project Validation
This is the minimum set of things FHWA must accept before they can assign a
project number, open FMIS, or allow federal obligation.
-- Purpose & Need — FHWA must agree the project is justified.
-- Alternatives — FHWA must agree the chosen alternative is reasonable.
-- Comparable Facility — FHWA must agree the replacement matches what existed.
-- Scope — FHWA must agree the project description is complete and consistent.
-- Cost — FHWA must agree the estimate is realistic and risk‑adjusted.
-- Schedule — FHWA must agree the timeline is credible.
-- Finance Plan — FHWA must agree the funding sources are real and sufficient.
-- NEPA — FHWA must agree the environmental document matches the design and
scope.
-- Eligibility — FHWA must agree the project qualifies for federal aid.
If any one of these is not validated, FHWA cannot:
-- assign a federal project number
-- open FMIS
-- obligate federal funds
Maryland is missing at least seven required FHWA validation elements, which is
why FHWA has not accepted the project, assigned a number, or opened FMIS
(Financial Management and Information System).
Congress approved a 100% federal share, but it did not approve a dollar amount.
FHWA still has to decide what the eligible replacement cost is, and until it
does, no major federal money can be obligated. The only funds actually released
so far are the $73 million in Emergency Relief, which covers debris removal,
temporary structures, and early design work.
States are allowed to begin design and early pre-construction at their own
financial risk before FHWA signs a project agreement. That’s why work is visible
even though the federal replacement funding isn’t approved yet. FHWA has not
committed to paying the full $5.2+ billion estimate — only the original
$1.7–$1.9 billion basis has statutory backing so far.
The MDTA scheme has deep water piers with almost the same vulnerability to ship
strike and destruction as did the original bridge. So they cannot assume a
lifespan of 100 years or even one year.
The solution is to build a modern HAZMAT capable tunnel like that on the VA
I-664 Monitor-Merrimac Memorial Bridge-Tunnel.
The Key Bridge Rebuild project does not have a federal project number -- that
speaks volumes about what FHWA thinks, here 28 months and counting.
The absence of a federal project number isn't a trivial point -- it's the
clearest indicator of FHWA's current posture. A project doesn't get an FP No.
until FHWA has accepted the scope, validated the cost, approved the Finance
Plan, and opened the project in FMIS.
The Key Bridge cost progression has nothing to do with actions by the federal
government.
The central issue is the same as in April: the funding gap. Maryland’s April
estimate placed the cost of the replacement structure in the $4.3–$5.2 billion
range, but Kiewit’s GMP proposal was reportedly well above that, likely
exceeding $6 billion, some say as much as $9 billion. The gap between the
state’s planning figure and the likely final cost remains unaddressed.
Why contractors are not eager
This project has become radioactive for several reasons:
The risk profile is extreme
- cable stayed design -- very large in span length and height
- deepwater foundations
- high‑capacity ship navigation channel
- complex marine logistics
- busy industrial harbor with many hazardous ship cargoes
- accelerated schedule 3 1/2 year construction expectations
- political pressure
- federal scrutiny
- public visibility
- no ability to hide delays or overruns
- monstrous MDTA mismanagement
Contractors hate risk they can’t price.
That is why the cost estimate is up in the stratosphere.
Legislation doesn’t force an agency to take an action it has no statutory
authority to perform. Congress can set conditions, but it can’t compel an agency
to violate its own governing statutes.
Texas tried this in the same Congressional omnibus bill with a rider directing the
Smithsonian to transfer Shuttle Discovery to Houston. The Smithsonian
declined because the National Collections policy and federal museum statutes
didn’t permit it. The rider didn’t override that. Discovery is staying at Udvar-Hazy!
:-)
Agencies follow their enabling statutes, not political language in an
appropriations rider.
The same principle applies here. Congress approved a 100% federal share, but
FHWA still has to determine the eligible comparable‑facility cost and issue a
project agreement. There is no authorization for any amount above the original
provisional $1.9B estimate, and FHWA hasn’t validated any replacement‑cost
figure.
Congress approved a 100% federal share, but it didn’t authorize a dollar figure.
There is no number in the bill. The only cost basis available at the time was
the early $1.7–$1.9B parametric estimate, and that’s what the share language was
implicitly tied to. FHWA still has to determine the eligible comparable‑facility
cost and issue a project agreement before any replacement funds can be
obligated. None of that has happened.
The only money actually released is the $73M for emergency and early‑phase work
— which is a completely different ER category.
Maryland’s $4.3–$5.2B figure is an accelerated program estimate that combines
demolition, temporary works, and schedule compression. FHWA’s
comparable‑facility baseline is built from a normal‑speed replacement. Those are
separate models, and ER eligibility is tied to the comparable model, not the
accelerated one.
Maryland’s estimate is high because of schedule compression, procurement timing,
and contractor risk pricing. If you want to argue those premiums are justified,
that’s a different discussion
FHWA has never issued a memo, authorization, or project agreement committing to
$1.9 billion — or any other amount. The only thing Congress approved was
a 100% federal share of whatever FHWA determines to be the eligible
comparable‑facility cost.
Clean
Summary
MDTA's bonding
capacity is already essentially maxed out -- roughly $4 billion outstanding,
with very limited headroom. They cannot issue $5.3 billion in new debt.
The state capital program doesn't have $5.3 billion available. The
Transportation Trust Fund doesn't have $5.3 billion available. And no federal
obligation has been issued because FHWA still hasn't assigned a federal project
number, which means the project isn't recognized in FMIS and no federal dollars
can be obligated.
So right now the procurement is moving, but the funding isn't. Until FHWA
accepts the project and obligates funds, the question of "where does the $5.3
billion come from?" remains unanswered. Some estimates balloon to $9 billion.
The Key Bridge
Rebuild project is dead in the water with a broken anchor line and is drifting
toward a lee shore.
Legend
MDTA -
Maryland Transportation Authority
MDOT - Maryland Department of Transportation
FHWA - Federal Highway Administration
USCG - U.S. Coast Guard
USACE - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
EIS - Environmental Impact Statement
NEPA - National Environmental Policy Act
FMIS - Financial Management and Information System
GMP - Guaranteed Maximum Price
PDB - Progressive Design-Build
NTP - Notice to Proceed
CNTP - Construction Notice to Proceed
RFQ - Request for Quotes
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Roads to the Future articles:
Monitor-Merrimac Memorial Bridge-Tunnel (I-664)
Baltimore Outer Harbor Crossing Replacement Proposal
Francis Scott Key Bridge (Outer Harbor Crossing)
Copyright © 2026 by Scott Kozel. All rights reserved. Reproduction, reuse,
or distribution without permission is prohibited.
By Scott M. Kozel, Roads to the Future
(Created 10-3-2026)